Wireless communication relies on access to the radiocommunications spectrum. A series of high-priced spectrum auctions has indicated that there is a scarcity or an inefficient use of spectrum resources. This paper presents an Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) model designed to study the secondary use spectrum market, which improves spectrum usage by allowing incumbent spectrum users to lease unused portions of their assigned spectrum to third parties who could put them to a better use. In this paper, we are particularly interested in the conditions under which such a market is likely to emerge.
Introduction
Innovative wireless communications services are among the most cutting edge technologies. During the past decade, the wireless communications industry has grown by orders of magnitude due to technological advances that allow widespread deployment and smaller, more reliable, and more affordable equipment. This explosive growth has stimulated the demand for access to spectrum and has consequently driven regulatory bodies and researchers to look into a more effective use of the radiocommunications spectrum. Measurement studies of the spectrum use in the FCC's Spectrum Policy Task Force (SPTF) report indicate that portions of spectrum are not in use in many geographical areas for significant periods of time [2] . In response to this, the FCC has taken steps to facilitate the development of markets for spectrum usage rights to permit spectrum to flow freely among users in response to economic demand [3] . These markets would allow incumbent spectrum users to lease unused portions of their assigned spectrum to third parties who could put them to better use. Leese et al. show that these kinds of trades enhance productive efficiency [8] . If a trade can be conducted with transparency and accountability, spectrum trading may impose a clear, market-based opportunity cost upon incumbents, thereby providing them with incentives to conserve spectrum. In the long run, the development of secondary markets includes a market for license trading and one for temporary access of existing licensed spectrum.
Spectrum trading as well as secondary use of spectrum raises numerous technical, institutional, economic, and strategic issues that merit investigation, many of which have been addressed in the literature [5, 6, 8, 10, 15] . These researchers have built technical, economic and techno-economic models to analyze questions related to spectrum commons and spectrum reuse using economic, game and auction theory. These papers have produced impressive theoretical results that provide significant advice to policymakers (for example, Rodriguez and Jondral show that Ultra-Wideband (UWB) Personal Area Networks (PANs) create no economic loss to incumbent carriers [15] ). This paper focuses on the secondary use of spectrum, defined as a temporal use of licensed spectrum owned by an incumbent who is distinct from the (temporary) spectrum user. We wish to extend previous work in this area to domains where agents have uncertainties about market demand, are only boundedly rational, and may act opportunistically. Thus, our approach has been to focus on the effects of the transaction costs that ensue under these conditions and the uncertainties due to potential interference [23] [24] [25] . In taking the transaction cost approach, we assert that the transaction costs associated with the market mechanism must be sufficiently low for secondary use to become practical. We expect that the adoption of secondary spectrum use will depend on technical factors (such as types of wireless services, coverage, and application requirements) and economic factors (such as number of market participants and price setting). In addition, different forms of secondary use (e.g., spot markets, long-term lease, Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO), and others) are potentially suitable in some environments and for some wireless services but not in others.
The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) framework has proven to be useful for studying the relationship between the characteristics of transactions and the suitable organizational forms for carrying them out. Instead of explicitly measuring transaction costs (which is quite difficult), TCE analyses assume that agents seek to minimize these costs by adopting various organizational forms. TCE identifies markets and firms (hierarchy) as two polar forms in
